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SUPPORT AND ALIENATION VIS-À-VIS THE
POLITICAL COMMUNITY: ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS
IN WALES AND QUEBEC

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Support and Alienation Vis-à-Vis the Political Community:
Attitudes Toward the Constitutional Options in Wales and Quebec

Introduction

The celebrated resurgence of ethnic identity and the demand for ethnic self-rule may be precursors of a new world of smaller, more homogeneous political communities. Or they may be the last gasp of parochial groups which have finally seen that they are doomed in industrial society. Whatever their eventual results will be, these movements now give us an opportunity to see people asking and answering the fundamental political question: "With whom do I want to make my political community?"

We shall explore here some answers to this question given by people in two places where the question is current: Wales and Quebec. By seeing what kinds of people prefer what alternatives, we shall attempt to delineate conditions under which a redefinition of a political community is likely.

Ethnic Territories

The phenomenon of ethnic territories (by which we mean geographically compact regions, with or without any formality or authority, within states, having ethnic distributions considerably different from other regions of those same states) is natural and persistent. Ethnic groups tend to survive when large and compact, and to disappear when small and dispersed, with the exception of a few "mobilized diasporas".¹ As the more assimilable groups are absorbed into the majority, those on the peripheries that are less accessible remain differentiated, thus decreasing the over-all

assimilability and increasing the over-all distinctiveness of the ethnic group members who are still distinct.² The relationship between ethnic assimilation and migration tends to reinforce this territorial separation.

Tension between territorial ethnic groups is just as natural as their existence. Ethnic groups tend to be culturally different; indeed, some see this as the defining difference.³ Hence they tend to value different things and prefer different policies. Further, the members of ethnic groups are usually easily distinguished because of racial features, language, dress, etc.; this means that when resources are scarce or scapegoats are sought and more or less arbitrary social cleavages become salient bases for allocation, ethnic cleavages are likely to be fixed upon as the "prominent solution", especially since they generally coincide in part with economic and territorial divisions. Beyond this, ethnic groups tend to have less contact with each other, because of language differences and territorial isolation, than do the sexes, economic classes, and racial groups, for example, thus less opportunity to resolve what tensions arise and to see them from each other's point of view.⁴ Ethnic tensions are likely to be exacerbated in highly participant politics, where popular support is needed by political office-holders, because ethnic symbols and ethnic grievances are among the most emotion-provoking and hence support-arousing of all. Finally, when the legitimacy of ethnic identity is high, as it has become in recent years, more people are willing to consider themselves members of ethnic groups in public and to form ethnically homogenous coalitions in political competition.

Support, Alienation, and the Political Community

In its by now classical conception, political support

is directed at three different levels of political objects: authorities, regime, and community. They are different levels, rather than just kinds, of objects because there is a certain order in which disaffected citizens are expected to withdraw their support from these objects. The authorities can lose considerable support before the regime loses any; and the regime can lose much before the community does. Support for objects at these three levels, in this view, would be distributed according to the model of a Guttman Scale: a citizen's support at each level would be a necessary but not sufficient condition for his support at the next lower level. (ed?)

A country with one or more ethnic territories is a place where this and other hypotheses about support for the political community can be tested. Not only is the general level of inter-group tension likely to be high in such a country for reasons indicated above, but also the withdrawal of political support from the community itself is a possible and plausible kind of behavior. Unlike other kinds of groups, territorially compact ethnic groups within a larger state can consider that they have real alternatives in the choice not only among rulers and rules, but also among definitions of membership in the polity.⁵ Having at least two alternative political communities to think about, members of an ethnic territory will tend to have meaningful ideas about the question. Their attitudes toward their present political community(s) will have policy implications, not just greater or lesser correspondence to a symbolic norm. And if the ethnic territory has enough of a political life of its own, its members will be making frequent choices in their everyday political behavior, supporting one, both, or neither of the communities in question.

Two Ethnic Territories

Wales and Quebec are ethnic territories conquered militarily by England in the 16th and 18th centuries, respectively, and still inhabited largely by people who perceive themselves and are perceived by others as ethnically distinct. The Welsh and the French Canadians (or Québécois) differ from the other ethnic groups of Great Britain and Canada in several ways; language, religion, and group identity are the paramount ones. In each territory, there is a widespread concern about economic dependence and inequality: English control of the means of production, English occupancy of the highest positions in the economy, and a territorial economy that is comparatively poor and un-self-sufficient. In each, there is also a fear that the cultural features of the territorial ethnic group--in particular, the Welsh and the French languages--will continue their downward slide toward extinction. And in each territory the existing constitutional arrangements are being called into question by those who would rather see the ethnic territory controlling more of its own destiny. But there is disagreement as to the economic effects of changes in the relationships between the two communities, e.g. whether complete separation would ruin or revive the territorial economy.

The countries' dominant groups have responded to this unrest in similar patterns. An early fashionable denigration of the territorial ethnic group has slowly given way to a more pluralist ideology which recognizes the group's value, its right to equality, its need for some special home-rule powers, and a justification for measures aimed at group preservation. This ideology, however, is not absolute, not close to universally accepted by the authorities and citizens, and not yet extensively implemented in new constitutional

arrangements. Political concessions have been given to the territory in both cases; Wales has more representatives in the House of Commons than does England on a per capita basis, and the Canadian party system in practice operates similarly to amplify the voice of the French Canadians, at least when the Liberal Party is in power.

The most striking difference between Wales and Quebec in this context is that Wales has been far more subordinated to British control and assimilatory pressure than has Quebec to Canadian. While England imposed a system of compulsory education through the English language on all of Wales, which only now is beginning to be relaxed, Quebec has always had a parochial school and university system operating from top to bottom in French. The initial centuries of British rule in Wales revealed an English elite desire to exterminate everything Welsh, while protections for the French Canadian culture have been a part of the Quebec *modus vivendi* since the conquest, and especially since the latest constitutional arrangement, the confederation of 1867. While the Welsh elite went to university in England and became English in language, religion, culture, and orientations, the French Canadian elite (chiefly the priesthood) kept the population Catholic, French-speaking, and fertile, to guard the integrity and in fact the expansion of the ethnic group. Quebec has its own provincial government with substantial powers, while Wales has no jurisdiction, representative body, or self-governing authority of any kind. In view of these differences in policy, it is not surprising that 88 percent of the population of Quebec can speak French, while only about 37 percent of the population of Wales can speak Welsh.⁶ It is also understandable that the British government is considering some devolution of power while the Canadian government is trying to stop or even reverse

the movement toward decentralization.⁷

The Constitutional Options

It is convenient and common to sum up the policies toward an ethnic territory, or responses by the territorial ethnic group, dichotomously: equality versus inequality; assimilationism versus ethnic nationalism.⁸ Ethnic politics are often seen as inherently noncompromisable, unlike economic politics.⁹ Yet this view, in its extreme form, is an oversimplification due to a lack of imagination. There are degrees of inequality, assimilation, and independence. Ethnic policies can be graduated in many ways. When the nature of the ethnic problem limits compromise (as in language policy), ethnic and nonethnic policies may be tied together in packages to provide nonethnic compensations for ethnic deprivations.¹⁰

In the case of the alternatives among political communities, there are likewise several options. The choice is not only which community one will join, for one can be a member of more than one at a time. As soon as this is understood, the question becomes one of allocating legitimacy and authority among competing communities. For someone in Quebec, the principal communities that come into consideration are Quebec and Canada, although the United States is occasionally discussed, out of fear by some and out of hope by others. In Wales the salient communities are Wales, the United Kingdom, and the European Communities.¹¹

We have chosen to focus on a set of options involving the relationship between two political communities: that of the ethnic territory and that of the state of which it is a part. In each case, we rank-order the options according to how much authority is given to the ethnic territory at the expense of the central state.

Conceptually, full integration of the territory into the central state with no formal recognition of the territory would be one end of this scale, and complete independence of the the territory as a sovereign member of the international community would be the other end. Operationally, the two ends and the points between them depend on the data we have about Welsh and Quebec citizens' preferences among the options, which we shall now describe.

The Data and the Variables

The data for the study are the results of two opinion surveys. One was conducted in Wales in 1971-72 by the second author and a number of local interviewers. They interviewed 417 persons, equally divided between a northern rural constituency (South Caernarvonshire) and a southern urban one (North Cardiff). Within each constituency, the respondents (plus about 90 nonrespondents) constituted a random sample of the adult population. Although the whole of Wales was not sampled, the two sampling areas were chosen because of their general similarity to most of Northern and Southern Wales, respectively.¹²

The other survey was conducted in Quebec in 1965 by the Groupe de recherches sociales for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and and Biculturalism. A total of 1613 persons were interviewed, selected at random from the adult population of Quebec by a complicated multi-stage stratified area random sampling procedure.¹³ In this procedure, persons having non-French last names were deliberately over-represented by about 300 percent to insure that a significant number of non-French Canadians would appear in the sample. The Quebec survey was an integral part of a survey being conducted throughout Canada.

In each survey, we have selected three questions on which to base the construction of our scale of constitutional options. The first two questions in the Welsh survey ask for reactions to statements:

7. Some people think it would be a good idea if the authorities in Wales were given more power to make government decisions. Do you . . .
 5. strongly agree 4. agree 3. depends
 2. disagree 1. strongly disagree
8. Some people think it would be a good idea if Wales had its own government, completely separate from England. Do you . . .
 5. strongly agree 4. agree 3. depends
 2. disagree 1. strongly disagree

The third asks:

30. Which of the following would you like to see happen.
 4. Wales become a separate country.
 3. Wales have a regional government like Northern Ireland.
 2. Wales stay the same.
 1. Wales become more integrated into the United Kingdom. ¹⁴

In the Quebec survey, the function of Welsh questions 7 and 30 is performed by a single question:

- 3-69. (GIVE CARD "E" TO RESPONDENT)
Which solution do you prefer concerning the political future of the province of Quebec?
 - 1__ That Quebec separates from the rest of Canada
 - 2__ That the federal government have more control over Quebec than it has now
 - 3__ That the federal government have less control over Quebec than it has now
 - 4__ That the position of the province of Quebec in Confederation remain the same as it is now
 - 5__ Other solution (Specify which solution: _____)
 - 6__ Undecided or depends

- 7___ Does not know
 8___ Treat Quebec as other provinces

The Quebec survey included two questions, however, on separatism:

- 3-74. There are people who suggest that the province of Quebec separate from the rest of Canada to form an independent country while other people oppose this. Personally, are you for or against the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada?

- 1___ For (Go to Q. 3-76)
 2___ Against (Go to Q. 3-76).
 5___ Undecided

- 3-75. Perhaps you are not decided, but if you had to take a decision, would you be inclined to favor the separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada?

- 1___ Yes
 2___ No
 7___ Does not know
 8___ Refuses to answer

Using these questions, we have constructed scales containing five options in Wales and four options in Canada. The Welsh options and the criteria for saying that a given respondent adhered to one of them are:

1. Centralization: 1 or 2 on Q. 7 and 1 or 2 on Q. 8 and 1 on Q. 30.
2. Status quo: 1 or 2 on Q. 7 and 1 or 2 on Q. 8 and 2 on Q. 30.
3. Decentralization: 4 or 5 on Q. 7 and 1 or 2 on Q. 8 and 2 on Q. 30.
4. Autonomy: 4 or 5 on Q. 7 and 1 or 2 on Q. 8 and 3 on Q. 30.
5. Separation: 4 or 5 on Q. 7 and 4 or 5 on Q. 8 and 4 on Q. 30.

The Quebec options are:

1. Centralization: 2 on Q. 3-69 and 2 on Q. 3-74 and not-1 on Q. 3-75.

2. Status quo: 4 on Q. 3-69 and 2 on Q. 3-74 and not-1 on Q. 3-75.
3. Decentralization: 3 on Q. 3-69 and ((2 on Q. 3-74 and not-1 on Q. 3-75) or (5 on Q. 3-74 and 2 on Q. 3-75)).
4. Separation: 1 on Q. 3-69 and ((1 on Q. 3-74 and not-2 on Q. 3-75) or (5 on Q. 3-74 and 1 on Q. 3-75)).

In both cases, not every respondent fulfilled the conditions for adherence to one of the options. The remaining respondents were divided into two categories, labeled "unclear" and "inconsistent". The unclears were excluded because of "don't know" or "it depends" answers; the inconsistent were excluded because of responses on the three questions that contradicted each other.

Choices Among the Options

Now that we have delineated the options, we can test some hypotheses about the kinds of people that choose them. It is worth remembering that the Welsh and the Quebec options are not directly comparable in terms of constitutional arrangements; for example, "autonomy" in Wales might result in a situation describable as "status quo" in Quebec. But both sets of options can be viewed as similar ordinal variables, and their last categories, "separation", are similar in meaning.

Hypothesis 1. Residents of an ethnic territory who belong to the territorial ethnic group will tend to be closer to the separatist end of the constitutional options scale than those who reside in the territory but do not belong to the territorial ethnic group. This is to be expected because people commonly prefer to belong to a majority, because economic discrimination against the ethnic territory is usually accompanied by intra-territorial discrimination

against members of the territorial ethnic group, and because one purpose of giving more authority to the territorial community is to protect its ethnic culture, which is of more concern to the members of that group than to their non-member co-residents.

The hypothesis is confirmed by the data from both surveys. If we consider self-identification as the criterion of ethnic group membership, we see in Tables 1 and 2 that members of territorial ethnic group are more likely to endorse separation than those whose ethnic identity relates them to the central state. Likewise, members of the central ethnic group are more likely to prefer centralization than members of the territorial ethnic group.

Besides confirming the hypothesis, the tables seem to reveal a startling difference between Wales and Quebec: a concentration of members of the territorial ethnic group much closer to the separatist end of the scale in Wales than in Quebec. While eighteen times more ethnic Welsh support separatism than centralization, many more French Canadians support centralization than separatism. It does not seem likely that the results would have been very different if the two surveys had been conducted at the same time, for separatism did not gain much support among French Canadians between 1965 and 1971.¹⁵ Yet much of the difference may still be artifactual. If the survey in Canada had been, comparably to the Welsh survey, confined to Quebec and to topics of concern in Quebec, using Québécois rather than Canadian terminology, respondents would probably have felt fewer inhibitions against giving separatist responses.¹⁶ Still, this characteristic of the Canadian survey should have influenced the responses of English and French Canadian respondents approximately equally, and, if so, we are still faced with a major difference between Wales and Quebec at the centralizing

end of the scale. In Wales, members of the central ethnic group are fifteen times more likely than members of the territorial ethnic group to favor centralization; in Quebec the ratio is less than two to one.

Hypothesis 2. Members of a territorial ethnic group who perceive that the territory or ethnic group is treated unfairly by the central government or by the central ethnic group will tend to be closer to the separatist end of the constitutional options scale than those perceiving fair treatment. This is expected because the perception of discrimination is likely to lead to either of two conclusions: (a) separation will improve our welfare; (b) separation will free us from inequality and degradation, even if it does not improve our absolute welfare.

To test this hypothesis for the Welsh, we have first constructed a variable based on two questions, one dealing with how the British government treats Wales and the other with whether there is job discrimination against Welshmen in favor of the English in Wales. Among respondents belonging to the territorial ethnic group, Table 3 shows that those perceiving both kinds of anti-Welsh discrimination are more concentrated at the separatist end than those perceiving neither type, although so few perceive both kinds of discrimination that the association is not very significant, statistically. Because indefinite answers to these questions were irreversibly coded identically with definite perceptions of equal treatment, we have also constructed a more stringent variable that includes a third question as well. This one asks whether the English have been trying to get too much power in Wales, and "don't know" answers are coded separately. Table 4 compares those who consistently perceive English or British bias against Wales and the Welsh with those who consistently

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fail to perceive it on these three questions. The former are so much more likely to be separatists than the latter that, in spite of their small numbers, the resulting relationship is highly significant in statistical terms. It is notable that all of the nine persons perceiving all three kinds of anti-Welsh bias and having a clear position on the constitutional options want more power for Wales, and six of the nine want total separation.

For Quebec we have also constructed two variables, trying to make them comparable with the Welsh ones. The Quebec questionnaire contains three questions parallel to those used in Wales, but two of them refer to discrimination in the context of Canada rather than the ethnic territory. The only directly comparable question asks whether the federal government takes as much care of the interests of Quebec as of the other provinces. Since the "don't know" problem does not exist for this survey, we can begin by relating the constitutional options scale to this question alone. In Table 5 we see the hypothesized relation; the worse a respondent believes the federal government treats Quebec, the closer to the separatist end of the scale he or she is likely to be. For the sake of comparison we can add a second question to the variable, this one dealing with job discrimination, remembering, however, that the question asks which group gets the best jobs in Canada, not in the ethnic territory. The hypothesis holds once again, as shown in Table 6.

Hypothesis 3. Members of a territorial ethnic group who have more concern for the preservation of the culture of that group will tend to be closer to the separatist end of the constitutional options scale than those with less concern. We expect to find this relationship because a state controlled by an ethnic group is generally viewed as a better guarantor of that group's cultural preservation than a

state in which the group is merely a minority.

In the Welsh questionnaire, two questions lend themselves to the testing of this hypothesis. Both ask about the Welsh language: the one, whether it is important to preserve the language, and the other, whether the present efforts for its preservation are enough. As Table 7 shows, the hypothesis is confirmed, with separatism twice as common among those who are concerned and dissatisfied with the efforts to preserve the language as among those who are not concerned and think that existing efforts are enough.

For the Quebec respondents the available question deals with the French Canadian way of life, rather than just with language. The question offered two positive alternatives: keeping their way of life versus living "more like the rest of Canadians". Although a number of intermediate answers were recorded (e.g. both), most respondents chose one of the polar opposites. We show in Table 8 how these are associated with the constitutional options scale. Within each opinion group, more respondents opt for the status quo than any other solution, but the distributions are substantially different in the predicted direction. Those wanting French cultural preservation are more than twice as likely to be separatists and less than half as likely to be centralizers as are those preferring that French Canadians live more like other Canadians.

Hypothesis 4. Members of a territorial ethnic group who have both the materialistic and the cultural attitudes hypothesized above to be conducive to separatism will tend to be closer to the separatist end of the constitutional options scale than those having only one of these kinds of attitude, and those having neither

kind will be closest of all to the centralizing end; but among those having just one such attitude, the distribution of constitutional preferences will be more separatist when only the cultural attitude is present than when only the materialistic one is. The first part of this hypothesis is based on a simple expectation of cumulativeness. The second part is based on the supposition that cultural preservation is a clearer rationale for separatism than economic gain. A widespread belief in economies of scale in modern industrial societies is expected to cause many persons to feel that secession by a small part of a large country will inevitably hurt the seceding territory in material terms, and that this will be the "price" paid for cultural autonomy and survival, which is seen as the only indisputable benefit of separation.

To test this hypothesis in Wales, the constitutional options scale is related simultaneously to the perception of ethno-territorial discrimination and to concern for the preservation of the language. In Tables 9 and 10, these two concepts are represented by a single question each, because otherwise the number of cases becomes minuscule. The questions are combined into a single variable, whose values are ordered according to the expected distribution of constitutional opinions. The respondents in the leftmost column should have the most separatist opinions, and those at the right the most centralizing opinions. The materialistic component of this variable is discrimination against Welsh job seekers in Table 9, and the treatment of Wales by the government in Table 10. In both tables essentially the hypothesized relationship is seen. A comparison of the two middle columns in either table confirms that people whose cultural-preservation attitudes incline them in one

direction, while their material-benefit attitudes push them in the other, more often go with the former than the latter. The strength of this association is about the same as the over-all relationship in each table ($r_c = -.258$, $p = .025$ in Table 9; $r_c = -.303$, $p = .014$ in Table 10). Both halves of hypothesis 4 are therefore confirmed; the cultural motivation for separatism appears to dominate the materialistic one as strongly as the double motivation dominates a single one.

The results of similar tests of the hypothesis for Quebec are shown in Tables 11 and 12. The over-all relationship is similar, but the disparity between the two motivations for separatism is not as great as in Wales. In Quebec, when we look only at the two middle columns, the strength of association drops for each table ($r_c = -.156$, $p = .055$ in Table 11; $r_c = -.136$, $p = .045$ in Table 12). The greatest difference between the cross-pressured respondents in Quebec is in their support for centralization, which is much more common among those who are only culturally than those who are only economically sanguine about it.

Hypothesis 5. Members of a territorial ethnic group will tend to be closer to the separatist end of the constitutional scale insofar as they conform more to the "post-industrial" type, i.e. occupy professional roles, live in or near cities, and are free of personal material anxiety. This hypothesis rests on the notion that ethnic concerns in highly industrialized societies such as the United Kingdom and Canada are a result of the satisfaction of material needs rather than their dissatisfaction. This application to ethnicity of the thesis of post-industrial value change can be found most recently in a paper by Jeffrey A. Ross.¹⁸

Opposing this hypothesis is what Hechter calls the "reactive theory

of ethnic change",¹⁹ in which ethnicity, never dying out in modern societies, owes its persistence to the continued "cultural division of labor", i.e. ethnic discrimination. The former theory views ethnic solidarity as awakened by indulgence; the latter sees it reacting to deprivation. If the argument for our previous hypothesis is correct, then ethnic solidarity which does emerge from discrimination will not necessarily turn into separatism, because of the fear that separation would worsen one's already precarious material condition. If only those who are willing to pay an economic price for cultural sovereignty move toward the separatist end of the scale, then the "post-industrial man" would appear the most likely social type to be found there.

In random-sample surveys few such persons turn up, so our ability to test this hypothesis must be questioned. In Wales the eight-level scale used to code respondents' occupations has a r_c of -0.19 ($p=0.003$) when associated with the constitutional options scale, supporting the hypothesis. The rural-urban (i.e. North-South) cleavage, however, which descriptions of Wales include as of fundamental importance, has no significant association with the scale. Nor does income. The occupational relationship becomes stronger and more significant among the rural respondents, and loses its significance among urban ones.

The hypothesis receives some more support from the Quebec data. The survey provides occupational information only for males; here the association between occupation, in a nine-level classification, and the constitutional options scale is in the hypothesized direction ($r_c = -0.13$) and statistically significant ($p=0.02$).

An urban-rural association also exists, showing in particular that separatism is largely an urban phenomenon, even more than other polls

have indicated (see Table 13). Although there are many non-responses, income is also significantly associated with the scale in the hypothesized direction ($r_c=0.13$; $p=0.001$). Education, measured in the number of years one has attended school, is similarly related ($r_c=0.14$, $p<0.0001$).

Conclusion

The amount of actual authority possessed by Quebec is far greater than that of Wales. The amount of authority desired by the citizens of Quebec, on the contrary, appears considerably less, on the average, than the amount wanted by the people of Wales. Notwithstanding these differences, the same kinds of people in both territories tend to support the same relative positions on the question of how much authority the territory— should have and how much authority the central state should have.

The first major similarity is that ethnicity is a most important predictor of the constitutional options that a person will consider and adopt. In spite of the efforts of many separatist leaders to stress territorial rather than ethnic grievances, and to assure members of the central ethnic group that they would be ^asafe and welcome minority ^y in a separate state,²⁰ identification with the territorial ethnic group is a virtual prerequisite of territorial separatism. Furthermore, this is not merely a result of the fact that we have chosen to define ethnic membership in subjective terms. Granted that the statement, "I think of myself as Welsh more than British", might be a reflection rather than a cause of separatist sentiment, we still find that the association between the constitutional options scale and ethnicity is strong—almost equally strong—when ethnicity is defined objectively. Since in Wales

(unlike Quebec) there is a substantial non-overlap between the two, we shall show this for Wales, where the possibility of disconfirmation is greater. We present in Table 14 the result of substituting objective for subjective ethnicity in Table 1.²¹

Within the territorial ethnic group, we have found that the centralization-separatism scale is related to both economic grievances and concern for the preservation of the ethnic culture. In both countries, it is persons with both these concerns who are likely to be closest to the separatist end of the scale, and persons with neither concern who are likely to be most centralist. In both countries those who are cross-pressured, having only one of these grievances, have a tendency to choose a constitutional option that conforms to their feelings about cultural preservation rather than economic discrimination. This, we have proposed, might be explained by the belief that separation is a sure aid to cultural preservation but an unsure source of material prosperity.

Does all this add up to confirmation of the thesis that ethnic politicization appeals primarily to post-industrial man? Our findings support the notion that people who have moved far in the post-industrial direction are somewhat more separatist on the average than everyone else; but they by no means have a monopoly on separatism. A small number of post-industrials may lead separatist movements, but their broad appeal extends to a large proportion of those in the territorial ethnic group who see the existing arrangements as discriminatory and as a threat to the culture, hence the persistence, of the ethnic group itself.²²

Notes

1. John A. Armstrong, "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship", in Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. Erich Goldhagen (New York: Praeger, 1968), 3-49.
2. Stanley Lieberman, Guy Dalto, and Mary Ellen Johnston, "The Course of Mother-Tongue Diversity in Nations", American Journal of Sociology, 81, 1975, 34-61, pp. 35-36.
3. Cynthia H. Enloe, Ethnic Conflict and Political Development (Boston: Little-Brown, 1973), 15.
4. Cf. Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
5. Stanley Lieberman, "Stratification and Ethnic Groups", in Sociological Inquiry, 40, (Spring) 1970, 172-81.
6. The analysis of Lieberman, Dalto, and Johnston, page 46, indicates that the language of instruction may have a great impact on language retention rates.
7. See Enloe, 121-26. There is obviously no such thing as an authoritative source on such a divisive topic as the politics of ethnic territories. Two informative and provocative ones, however, are Micheal Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkley: California, 1975), and Dale C. Thomson (ed.), Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973).
8. E.g. Hechter, xvii.
9. E.g. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model", Comparative Politics, 2, 1970, 337-63.
10. This is not recognized by some otherwise outstanding analyses of ethnic and language politics, e.g. Vernon Van Dyke, "Human Rights Without Distinction as to Language", International Studies Quarterly, 20, 1976, 3-38.

11. See Ned Thomas, The Welsh Extremist (Talybont, Wales: Y Lolfa, 1973), 135-36.

12. See Raymond R. Corrado, "Nationalism and Communalism in Wales", Ethnicity, 2, 1975, 360-81, p. 381, note 5.

13. See Jonathan Pool, "Language and National Integration: Canada as a Test of Some Hypotheses", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971, Appendix A, 215-19.

14. In the original survey questionnaire, the response alternatives were numbered in reverse order.

15. Maurice Pinard, "The Ongoing Political Realignment in Quebec", in Quebec Society and Politics, 119-38, pp. 134; 136, note 8.

16. In fact, polls of French-speaking Québécois during the same years typically found about 18% support for separatism among the decided respondents (Pinard). But some of this difference is probably due to the fact that these polls did not offer decentralization as an alternative. For an example of Canadian terminology in the Quebec questionnaire, consider the following introduction to a series of questions: "In addition to English Canadians and French Canadians, you know that there are in Canada Italian Canadians, German Canadians, Jewish Canadians, Ukrainian Canadians and Canadians of many other origins. I would like to know your opinion about these different groups of Canadians."

17. Respondents in the middle category are those who said preservation was important but were satisfied with the efforts being made.

18. "An Analysis of the Emergence of Ethnicity in the Politics of Post-Industrial Society", paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, February, 1976.

19. Hechter, chapter 10. Cf. Martin O. Heisler, "Constitutional and Legal Means for Managing Demands for Group Autonomy: A Plea for a Beginning", paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, February, 1976, pp. 14-15.
20. E.g. René Lévesque, Leader of the Parti Québécois.

21. Objective ethnicity is defined here in terms of three characteristics. To be "British" one must live in the urban sampling area, report that neither parent spoke Welsh, and state that one does not speak or read Welsh. To be objectively "Welsh" one must live in the rural area, report that both parents spoke Welsh, and speak Welsh at home either instead of or in addition to English. By contrast, the subjective question in Wales asked how the respondent usually thought of himself, British, Welsh, Anglo-Welsh, or sometimes British and sometimes Welsh. In Quebec there were two questions, one on the group that the respondent usually considered himself to belong to, and the other on whether the respondent felt closer to the English or the French Canadians; those classified as "English" or "French" were the ones who answered both questions in the same way.

22. Cf. the coalition which defeated Norway's entry into the European Communities.

TABLE 1. ETHNIC IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: WALES

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
 WALES PREFERRED WALES CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY ETHNICITY ETHNIC SELF-IDENTIFICATION FORMED BY
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		IDENTITY					
		COUNT	PER	IRISH	MIXED	WELSH	ROM TOTAL
		I	I	I	I	I	I
		I	I	I	I	I	I
DEATH		1	1	1	2	1	3
		1	1	1	1	1	1
CHURCH TO D.A.		1	13	1	4	1	2
		1	19.2	1	8.2	1	1.3
STATUS AND		2	1	21	1	17	1
		1	31.8	1	14.7	1	11.6
LESS OR CONTROL		3	1	12	1	5	1
		1	18.2	1	10.2	1	21.3
AUTONOMY		4	1	17	1	21	1
		1	25.8	1	42.9	1	41.9
SEPARATE COUNTRY		5	1	3	1	2	1
		1	4.5	1	4.1	1	23.9
UNCLEAR		6	1	318	1	258	1
		1	.0	1	.0	1	.0
NOT		6	1	178	1	98	1
		1	.0	1	.0	1	.0
COLUMN		68		42		123	
TOTAL		24.4		18.1		52.4	

FINDING IN THE C = .31650. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 147

TABLE 2. ETHNIC IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: QUEBEC

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
 QUEBEC PREFERRED QUEBEC CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY ETHNICITY ETHNIC SELF-IDENTIFICATION FORMED BY
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		ETHNICITY					
		COUNT	PER	IRISH	MIXED	FRENCH	ROM TOTAL
		I	I	I	I	I	I
		I	I	I	I	I	I
DEATH		1	1	1	2	1	3
		1	1	1	1	1	1
CHURCH TO D.A.		1	1	34	1	58	1
		1	19.2	1	16.1	1	11.0
STATUS AND		2	1	119	1	240	1
		1	67.2	1	66.7	1	47.8
LESS OR CONTROL		3	1	73	1	57	1
		1	13.0	1	15.9	1	34.4
SEPARATE COUNTRY		4	1	1	1	3	1
		1	.4	1	1.4	1	7.0
UNCLEAR		6	1	338	1	1838	1
		1	.0	1	.0	1	.0
NOT		6	1	34	1	58	1
		1	.0	1	.0	1	.0
COLUMN		177		160		524	
TOTAL		14.7		23.9		49.8	

FINDING IN THE C = .21115. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 350

TABLE 3. PERCEIVED ETHNO-TERRITORIAL DISCRIMINATION AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: WALES

***** C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N O F *****
 MFATE PREFERRED WALES CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY WDEP TREATMENT OF W IN JCS 1 CONT.
 CONTROLLING FOR..
 IDENTITY ETHNIC SELF-APPELLATION--COLLAPSED VALUE.. 3 WELSH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		WDEP			
COUNT	COL PCT	TREATED	WELSH	ROW	TOTAL
		10.K.	DEPRIVED		
MFATE		1	1	2	
	2	1	1	1	11
STATUS	QUO	1	14.1	1	13.3
	3	1	18	1	21
LESS UK CONTROL	1	25.4	1	25.0	25.3
	4	1	28	1	30
AUTONOMY	1	39.4	1	16.7	36.1
	5	1	15	1	21
SEPARATE COUNTRY	1	27.1	1	50.0	25.3
	6	1	25	1	29M
UNCLEAR	1	.0	1	.0	.0
	6	1	15M	1	15M
NOT	CSISTENT	1	.0	1	.0
COLUMN		71	12		83
TOTAL		70.0	14.0		100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = .11715. SIGNIFICANCE .0861

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS 334

TABLE 4. DISCRIMINATION, POWER/HUNGER, AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: WALES

***** C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N O F *****
 MFATE PREFERRED WALES CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY EBYAS PERCEIVED E LINE AGING: W
 CONTROLLING FOR..
 IDENTITY ETHNIC SELF-APPELLATION--COLLAPSED VALUE.. 3 WELSH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		EBYAS			
COUNT	COL PCT	INTIM	LOW	ROW	TOTAL
		1	2		
MFATE		1	1	2	
	2	1	0	1	9
STATUS	QUO	1	.0	1	31.0
	3	1	1	1	12
LESS UK CONTROL	1	11.1	1	41.4	34.2
	4	1	2	1	8
AUTONOMY	1	22.2	1	27.4	26.3
	5	1	4	1	0
SEPARATE COUNTRY	1	64.7	1	.0	15.8
	6	1	4M	1	12M
UNCLEAR	1	.0	1	.0	.0
	6	1	1M	1	5M
NOT	CSISTENT	1	.0	1	.0
COLUMN		9	29		38
TOTAL		23.7	76.3		100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = -.00111. SIGNIFICANCE .0001

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS 379

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* * * * * C R O S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * *
Q8ATE  PREFERRED QUEBEC CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS      BY VAR142  FED. GOV. TREATS QUEBEC NOW CF: OTHERS?
CONTROLING FOR..
ETHNIC1  ETHNIC IDENTITY & SYMPATHY                VALUE..    3  FRENCH
* * * * * PAGE 1 OF 1
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		VAR167							
		COUNT	BETTER		EQUALLY		WORSE		ROW
		COL	FET						TOTAL
			1	1	2	1	3	1	
DATE			1	1	1	1	1	1	
			1	4	19		26		49
			14.3		11.7		11.0		11.3
			1	1	1	1	1	1	
			2	13	63		89		195
			44.0		57.4		37.7		45.8
			1	1	1	1	1	1	
			3	11	44		95		150
			39.3		27.2		40.3		35.2
			1	1	1	1	1	1	
			4	0	6		26		32
			1	0	3.7		11.0		7.5
			1	1	1	1	1	1	
			0	134	8		95		1924
			1	0	0		0		0
			1	1	1	1	1	1	
			5	04	104		114		214
			1	0	0		0		0
			1	1	1	1	1	1	
			20		162		236		426
			4.6		38.0		55.4		100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = .14141. SIGNIFICANCE = .0002

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1167

TABLE 6. PERCEIVED ETHNO-TERRITORIAL DISCRIMINATION AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: QUEBEC

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
DATE PREFERRED QUEBEC CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY FREQ OF CAN-QUEBEC DEPRIVATION IDEAL TYPE
CONTROLLING FOR..
ETHNICITY ETHNIC IDENTITY & SYMPATHY VALUE.. 3 FRENCH
***** PAGE 1 OF 1

	COUNT	FDP			
	COL PCT	TREATED	FC'SIQUE	ROW	
		IO.K.	DEPRIVO	TOTAL	
DEATH		1	2	1	
	1	4	13	1	17
MORE FED CONTROL		12.1	7.7	1	8.5
	2	21	42	1	83
STATUS OWN		43.6	36.9	1	41.3
	3	7	72	1	79
FBS FED CONTROL		21.2	42.9	1	39.3
	4	1	21	1	22
SEPARATE COUNTRY		3.0	12.5	1	10.9
	0	21M	68M	1	89M
INT.FAR		.0	.0	1	.0
	5	1M	7M	1	8
INT	CRISTENT	.0	.0	1	.0
		33	168		201
	TOTAL	14.4	83.4		100.0

KENDALL'S TAU B = .17574. SIGNIFICANCE = .0009

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1012

TABLE 7. CULTURAL CONSERVATIONISM AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: WALES

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
 WFAPE PREFERRED WALES CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY LANGKEEP CARES ABOUT PRESERVING WELSH?
 CONTROLLING FOR...
 IDENTITY ETHNIC SELF-APPELLATION-COLLAPSED VALUE.. 3 WELSH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		LANGKEEP						
COUNT		YES		YES BUT NO WORRY		NO		ROW TOTAL
COL	PCT	YES	NO	YES	BUT NO WORRY	NO		
		1	1	2	1	3	1	
WFAPE		1	1	1	1	1	1	
	1	1	0	1	2	1	0	2
CLOSED TO U.K.		1	0	1	2.7	1	0	1.3
	2	1	2	1	2	1	3	13
STATUS QUO		1	3.6	1	10.7	1	30.6	9.5
	3	1	5	1	23	1	3	30
LESS UK CONTROL		1	8.9	1	30.7	1	33.3	21.9
	4	1	28	1	29	1	1	38
AUTONOMY		1	50.6	1	38.7	1	16.7	42.3
	5	1	21	1	13	1	0	34
SEPARATE COUNTRY		1	37.5	1	17.3	1	1.0	24.8
	6	1	114	1	19	1	44	244
UNCLEAR		1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	1.0
	7	1	84	1	16	1	44	244
NOT CONSISTENT		1	1.0	1	1.0	1	1.0	1.0
		1	1	1	1	1	1	
COLUMN TOTAL		36	75	4	137			
		40.9	54.7	4.4	100.0			

KENDALL'S TAU C = -.33230. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 280

TABLE 8. CULTURAL CONSERVATIONISM AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: QUEBEC

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
 WFAPE PREFERRED QUEBEC CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY VAR377 SHOULD PEAKS KEEP WAY OF LIFE?
 CONTROLLING FOR...
 ETHNICITY ETHNIC IDENTITY & SYMPATHY VALUE.. 3 FRENCH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		VAR377				ROW TOTAL
COUNT		NO				
COL	PCT	YES	NO	YES	NO	
		1	1	2	1	
DATE		1	1	1	1	
	1	27	0	1	47	
MORE FFB CONTROL		9.2	20.2	1	12.0	
	2	126	4	1	180	
STATUS QUO		43.2	54.5	1	44.0	
	3	115	2	1	137	
LESS FFB CONTROL		39.4	22.2	1	35.0	
	4	24	3	1	27	
SEPARATE COUNTRY		8.2	3.0	1	4.9	
	5	1774	444	1	2214	
UNCLEAR		1.0	1.0	1	1.0	
	6	144	44	1	224	
NOT CONSISTENT		1.0	1.0	1	1.0	
COLUMN TOTAL		9	99	391		
		74.7	25.3	100.0		

KENDALL'S TAU C = -.20142. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1222

TABLE 9. CULTURAL VS. ETHNICALLY MATERIAL CONCERNS AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: WALES

27.

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
 WFAFE PREFERRED WALES CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY CULMAT1 LAND EFFORTS : JOB EQUALITY OK?
 CONTROLLING FOR..
 IDENTITY ETHNIC SELF-APPELLATION--COLLAPSED VALUE.. 3 WELSH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		CULMAT1				ROW TOTAL
		COUNT	COL PCT	NOYES	YESNO	
		1	2	3	4	
		1	2	3	4	
WFAFE		1	1	1	1	
CLOSER TO U.K.		1	0	0	1	2
		1	0	0	1	2
STATUS QND		2	1	2	3	14
		1	5.6	5.0	13.6	10.1
LESS UK CONTROL		3	1	2	5	30
		1	11.1	7.5	22.7	21.6
AUTONOMY		4	1	22	6	59
		1	8.9	5.0	34.4	42.4
SEPARATE COUNTRY		5	1	13	5	34
		1	44.4	32.5	22.7	24.5
UNCLEAR		0	1	0M	12M	33M
		1	0	0	0	0
NOT	CONSISTENT	4	1	4M	3M	13M
		1	0	0	0	0
COLUMN TOTAL		18	40	32	59	139
		12.9	28.8	15.8	42.4	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = -.27245. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 278

TABLE 10. CULTURAL VS. TERRITORIAL MATERIAL CONCERNS AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: WALES

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
 WFAFE PREFERRED WALES CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY CULMAT2 LAND EFFORTS : GOVT'S WALES ACTIONS OK?
 CONTROLLING FOR..
 IDENTITY ETHNIC SELF-APPELLATION--COLLAPSED VALUE.. 3 WELSH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		CULMAT2				ROW TOTAL
		COUNT	COL PCT	NOYES	YESNO	
		1	2	3	4	
		1	2	3	4	
WFAFE		1	1	2	3	
CLOSER TO U.K.		1	0	0	1	2
		1	0	0	1	2
STATUS QND		2	1	2	3	14
		1	4.3	5.6	12.0	10.1
LESS UK CONTROL		3	1	4	7	30
		1	4.3	11.1	8.0	22.1
AUTONOMY		4	1	12	9	59
		1	34.5	47.2	34.0	27.5
SEPARATE COUNTRY		5	1	8	5	34
		1	34.4	26.1	20.0	14.3
UNCLEAR		0	1	3M	9M	10M
		1	0	0	0	0
NOT	CONSISTENT	4	1	3M	3M	13M
		1	0	0	0	0
COLUMN TOTAL		22	36	25	36	139
		15.8	28.9	18.0	40.3	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = -.26321. SIGNIFICANCE = .0001

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 278

TABLE 11. CULTURAL VS. ETHNICALLY MATERIAL CONCERNS AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: QUEBEC

***** CROSSTABULATION OF *****
 OFATE PREFERRED QUEBEC CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY CULMAY1 EDWINS HURT FROM CULTURE & QUEST
 CONTROLLING FOR...
 ETHNOC01 ETHNIC IDENTITY & SYMPATHY VALUE.. 3 FRENCH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

OFATE	COUNT COL PCT	CULMAY1				ROW TOTAL
		YESYES	YESNO	NOYES	NOINO	
		1	2	3	4	
	1	9	2	13	3	27
MORE FED CONTROL	4.7	5.6	20.0	21.4	8.8	
	2	73	23	37	5	138
STATUS QUD	38.2	43.9	54.9	35.7	45.1	
	3	87	9	12	4	114
LESS FED CONTROL	46.6	25.0	18.5	42.9	37.9	
	4	20	2	3	0	25
SEPARATE COUNTRY	10.3	5.6	4.6	.0	6.2	
	0	125M	19M	29M	7M	160M
UNCLEAR	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	
	5	11M	6M	2M	1M	14M
NOT	11.9	.0	.0	.0	.0	
CONSISTENT						
COLUMN TOTAL		191	36	65	14	306
TOTAL		42.6	11.8	21.2	4.6	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = -.21465. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1307

TABLE 12. CULTURAL VS. TERRITORIAL MATERIAL CONCERNS AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: QUEBEC

***** CROSSTABULATION OF *****
 OFATE PREFERRED QUEBEC CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY CULMAY2 EDWINS HURT FROM CULTURE & TERRITORY
 CONTROLLING FOR...
 ETHNOC01 ETHNIC IDENTITY & SYMPATHY VALUE.. 3 FRENCH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

OFATE	COUNT COL PCT	CULMAY2				ROW TOTAL
		YESYES	YESNO	NOYES	NOINO	
		1	2	3	4	
	1	10	12	31	5	38
MORE FED CONTROL	7.5	11.9	28.2	11.4	11.9	
	2	43	53	18	27	143
STATUS QUD	32.3	54.5	44.2	41.4	45.0	
	3	64	31	8	11	114
LESS FED CONTROL	47.8	30.7	20.5	25.0	35.8	
	4	17	3	2	1	23
SEPARATE COUNTRY	12.7	3.0	5.1	2.3	7.2	
	0	38M	55M	13M	12M	138M
UNCLEAR	.0	.0	.0	.0	.0	
	5	9M	4M	1M	2M	16M
NOT	11.9	.0	.0	.0	.0	
CONSISTENT						

STATISTICAL COMPUTING CENTER CLOSING IN 30 MINUTES.....

COLUMN TOTAL	134	181	39	44	318
TOTAL	42.1	31.8	12.3	13.6	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = -.23082. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1297

TABLE 13. RESIDENTIAL CONTEXT AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: QUEBEC

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
 DEATE PREFERRED QUEBEC CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY VAR430 SIZE & TYPE OF LOCALITY
 CONTROLLING FOR:
 ETHNOR1 ETHNIC IDENTITY & SYMPATHY VALUE.. 3 FRENCH
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		VAR430				ROW TOTAL
COUNT		VILLAGE	TOWN	CITY	METROPL	
DEATE	COL PCT	1	2	3	4	
1	1	10	4	6	38	58
NEAR FEN CONTROL		14.7	4.1	11.1	12.1	11.0
2	1	38	58	24	130	250
STATUS QUO		41.3	9.2	44.4	41.5	47.6
3	1	11	33	20	116	180
LESS FEN CONTROL		18.3	31.7	37.0	37.1	34.3
4	1	1	3	4	29	37
SEPARATE COUNTRY		1.7	3.1	7.4	9.3	7.0
0	1	77N	40N	5	170N	332N
UNCL FEN		.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
5	1	2N	8N	1N	14N	23N
NOT CSISTENT		.0	.0	.0	.0	.0
COLUMN TOTAL		40	98	54	113	325
TOTAL		11.4	18.7	10.3	59.6	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = .09327. SIGNIFICANCE = .0016

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 1088

TABLE 14. OBJECTIVE ETHNICITY AND COMMUNITY PREFERENCE: WALES

***** CROSS TABULATION OF *****
 WFATE PREFERRED WALES CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS BY ETHNOR1 GEOLINGUISTIC ETHNIC TRAITS
 ***** PAGE 1 OF 1

		ETHNOR1			ROW TOTAL
COUNT		WELSH	BRITISH ?		
WFATE	COL PCT	1	2	0	
1	1	4	9	4N	13
CLOSER TO U.K.		3.6	11.8	.0	7.0
2	1	12	24	20N	36
STATUS QUO		10.9	31.6	.0	19.4
3	1	23	14	11N	39
LESS UK CONTROL		22.7	19.4	.0	21.0
4	1	44	22	37N	64
ANTHONY		40.0	28.9	.0	33.5
5	1	23	7	10N	32
SEPARATE COUNTRY		22.7	9.2	.0	17.2
0	1	27N	34N	34N	97N
UNCLEAR		.0	.0	.0	.0
6	1	21N	12N	17N	50N
NOT CSISTENT		.0	.0	.0	.0
COLUMN TOTAL		110	76	137N	186
TOTAL		59.1	40.9	.0	100.0

KENDALL'S TAU C = -.13634. SIGNIFICANCE = .0000

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS = 231